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Abstract 
The origin of the Eurozone crisis lies neither in unsustainable borrowing nor in 
arbitrary demands of creditors. Rather, its origin lies in the effects of seemingly 
arcane technicalities to which sovereign debt issuance is subject. To show this, this 
paper proposes a set of terms equipped to analyze the effects of these minuscule 
technicalities. The notion of country fundamentals could be replaced with that of 
a fundamental to show that a country is not subject to market assessment when 
borrowing, but rather subject to market lending pressures forcing it to adopt certain 
policies even in the absence of outright imposition. Moreover, the paper argues for 
the notions of flow-stock conversion and liquidity-solvency conversion. The former 
allows the conversion of sovereign debt as a fiscal instrument to sovereign debt as an 
asset, thus embedding it into sovereign debt market dynamics. These, in turn, play 
out as pressure upon the country through the liquidity-solvency conversion turning 
portfolio restructurings into fiscal solvency shortages. Finally, the paper analyzes 
countries as intra-market hedges and extra-market hedges to illustrate the extent 
of market pressures upon countries: to recapitalize banks, countries need to issue 
more debt, doubling down on the pressure from the liquidity-solvency conversion.
Keywords: Country Fundamentals; Eurozone Crisis; Flow-Stock Conversion; 
Liquidity-Solvency Conversion; Sovereign Debt and Sovereignty
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Introduction
 With the recent troubles facing Greece, threatening its membership in 
the Eurozone, it has come to be reinforced that the Eurozone crisis is here to stay 
(Wearden and Fletcher 2015). To most, the origin and duration of the crisis are 
explained by the recklessness of European peripheral governments – particularly 
Greece – whose unwillingness to reform, sustained prior to 2009 by a corresponding 
market willingness to lend regardless, has now come to threaten to structural 
integrity of the Eurozone itself (ECB 2010; Belke 2011). Others have criticized this 
approach, arguing that the Eurozone crisis is a crisis of growth, originating on bank 
balance sheets and protracted by austerity (Shambaugh 2012; Blyth 2015).
 This paper positions itself between the two approaches, albeit closer to the 
latter. I argue that the origin of the Eurozone crises lies neither in governments’ 
fiscal practices as such, nor in deliberate actions of European banks. Sweeping 
claims from both sides – morally pernicious recklessness of Southern European 
governments; a ‘bait-and-switch’ by the European banking system (Blyth 2015: 73) 
– are equally problematic. I maintain that a nuanced and precise discussion of the 
political effects contained in sovereign debt technicalities exposes more about the 
origins of the Eurozone crisis than sweeping claims from either side.
 By the same token, I propose in this paper a terminology which I maintain 
is better equipped than that of critical or mainstream views on the crisis to expose 
the minuscule power effects contained in sovereign debt technicalities. These create 
a political dynamic to which both creditors and debtors are subject - though the 
latter, to be sure, to a more substantial extent. The given terminology of studies 
on sovereign debt (‘moral hazard’, ‘contagion’, ‘time horizons’, ‘fundamentals’, and 
so forth) cannot be used because it suggests the exact opposite of what I aim to 
show: namely, that the legal and economic conditions of sovereign debt issuance are 
indeed a wholly apolitical affair.
 This paper therefore introduces and discusses three sets of terms, building 
upon one another to gradually expose the full extent of what is contained in 
supposedly minuscule technicalities on European primary and secondary sovereign 
debt markets. In the first section, I criticize what I call here the ‘representational 
perspective’ in which sovereign bond interest rates are set by markets in reaction to 
the economic soundness of sovereigns, i.e., to country fundamentals (debt-to-GDP 
ratio, inflation, productivity indexes, and so forth). I concur with the literature that 
certain phenomena on sovereign debt markets – particularly so-called ‘flights’ from 
one asset class to another – are not sufficiently explained by this representational 
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notion. Neither do I agree that they constitute arbitrariness on the side of the 
creditors, however – as is sometimes argued (e.g., LiPuma and Lee 2004). Rather, I 
argue that a technicality is at work here. Sovereign debt works in two distinct ways: 
as a fiscal instrument for the debtor, and as an asset for the creditor. I argue that the 
latter requires markets to subject debtors to what I call the flow-stock conversion. 
As a fiscal instrument, sovereign bonds are issued as a promise to be repaid. As an 
asset, however, this repayment must be assumed to be guaranteed. Countries are 
therefore, when subject to market lending, operationalized by the demands of this 
lending in a precise technical form. They come to be shaped by the demands of debt 
repayment - not in an arbitrary form, but precisely along the lines imposed upon 
them by the asset function of their bonds. Countries are therefore converted into 
what I propose to call fundamentals.
 In the second section, I continue the analysis by arguing that the power 
mechanism by which countries are converted into fundamentals is once again less 
arbitrary than critics assume. Its precise form is what I call a liquidity-solvency 
conversion, by which liquidity withdrawals from a certain asset class - sovereign 
bonds of specific countries or country groups - come to be converted to solvency 
problems. Mark Blyth is right, I maintain, in saying that the Eurozone crisis was not 
due to country spending, but liquidity withdrawals – yet, the precise form of these 
withdrawals indicates less arbitrariness and more technicality than he assumes (2015: 
51-94). In the third section, I extend the implications of the concepts proposed here 
to the notion of crisis itself: the pre-2008 boom and post-2008 bust of European 
liquidity is neither a question of governmental excess, nor of market irrationality. 
I argue that it is rather due to a structural oscillation in the relation described here 
as country-fundamental conversion, and that this oscillation is not significantly 
explained within the crisis/normality paradigm. Fundamentals, as proposed here, 
are wholly internal to sovereign debt markets, which is to say that no aberration 
from normality – no crisis – can be discerned.
Flow-Stock Conversion
 In this first section, I reconstruct the internal logic of sovereign bonds as an 
asset class, and observe their relation to sovereign debtors and creditors: the issuing 
country and its financiers. On the one hand, sovereign bonds are usually interpreted 
to be representational instruments: sovereign bond interest rates are set by markets 
in reaction to the country’s economic fundamentals (Eaton 1993: 141). Thus, the 
present section examines the representational perspective of sovereign bonds. I 
show here, however, that this perspective is in fact the reverse of how sovereign 
bonds actually work. Sovereign bond issuance serves to finance government policies, 
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whose economic effects in turn influence country fundamentals (ibid: 140-141). 
Moreover, “[t]he existing literature is unanimous in finding that spreads of euro area 
government bond markets reflect liquidity and credit risks, and are mainly driven 
by a common factor,” an “international risk aversion.” (Manganelli and Wolswijk 
2009: 194) This means that market lending can be said to have an influence on 
country fundamentals, shedding doubt on the representational perspective.
 First, markets lend expecting repayment, thus reducing policies to their 
fiscal impacts and thus to likelihoods of continued debt service prioritization. In the 
Eurozone in particular, it has been found that “credit markets (…) exert disciplinary 
pressure on governments with a shift [after EMU, S.E.] to debt-service ratio as the 
most relevant measure of creditworthiness.” (Lo Conte 2009: 363; cf. Belke 2011) 
Second, market lending transposes actual or observed economic fundamentals to 
projected performances, inferring sovereign debt risk premia from these projections 
(Eaton 1993: 166-169; Eichengreen 2003: 87). Risk premia denote interest rate 
mark-ups relative to the interest rates demanded for a benchmark bond – in Europe, 
usually Germany’s 10 year bond (Lo Conte 2009: 353). Finally, market lending 
influences fundamentals by rearranging governmental stakeholders, often turning 
government official’s attention from one set of national or domestic stakeholders 
to another, or to an international level. Stiglitz (2010: 36) characterizes the multi-
tiered stakeholder structure of sovereign bonds as the decisive aspect in the match 
or mismatch between legal and political aspects of sovereign debt.
 Uniting these perspectives is a prioritization of the asset function of 
sovereign debt (its role on creditor portfolios) over their fiscal function (financing 
the debtor’s government). In the European context, the goal of the transposition of 
country policies to sovereign bond interest rates is for the bonds to perform as debt 
securities on banks’ portfolios (Lo Conte 2009: 341-342). European sovereign debt 
securities are assets eligible to be held as tier 1 positions under Basel II regulations 
as incorporated in the European context by the European Capital Requirements 
Directives CRD III (up to 2013) and CRD IV. Such tier 1 capital ensures that a 
financial actor – in this case: a bank – can covering a sufficient amount of operative 
losses before requiring a bailout (Moseley 2013: 653). In a leveraged operation, a 
financial actor holds only a fraction of the capital advanced – by a factor called 
‘leverage ratio’ and specifically defined by the European Banking Authority (BIS 
2013) – while borrowing the remainder from other financial actors. Since repayment 
of the latter funds depends on the outcome of the investment, only the former is 
safe in case of a market downturn. Assets belonging to the tier 1 capital category 
therefore have to be particularly safe to guarantee the basic existence and well-being 
of the financial actor. Designating them as tier 1 capital therefore means, from a 
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regulatory perspective, that any sovereign bond held by a bank is eligible to be used 
as collateral in a leveraging operation (cf. Epstein and Habbard 2013: 330).
 However, this function depends on a crucial presupposition: sovereign bonds, 
which in reality are a flow of payments from the debtor country to its creditors, to be 
considered a stock. This is a temporal transposition. Sovereign bond purchases by 
creditors depend on “the extent that government default is anticipated.” (Guerreri et 
al. 2012: 188) By virtue of this anticipation, the flow of sovereign debt repayments is 
converted to a stock for the purposes of sovereign debt as an asset. This flow-stock 
conversion converts actual into projected payment flows. The expectation by which 
sovereign bonds can perform their role as stable assets – as tier 1 capital – is that 
repayment by their issuer, the debtor country, is guaranteed. This seems reasonable 
since the issuer is a sovereign entity (Eaton 1993: 140). The sovereignty of the debtor 
allows investors to expect it to exercise its coercive powers to tax or, at least, to 
invoke its credit ratings to borrow internally (Mundell 1996: 77, 110; Panizza 2010: 
91-107). For this reason, sovereign bonds can serve as tier 1 assets: it is reasonable 
to assume their stock function to be fulfilled at all times.
 By the same token, however, repayment depends to a certain extent on 
the willingness of country officials to prioritize debt servicing – or even to repay 
debt at all (Eaton 1993: 166). Indeed, one of the aspects of sovereign borrowing 
most often discussed in the literature is that, for lack of enforcement mechanisms, 
a sovereign default is always just one politician’s moral hazard away (Eichengreen 
2003: 93; Panizza et al. 2009: 659). To maintain the flow-stock conversion, then, it is 
necessary to ensure debt service prioritization. For example, in its second adjustment 
programme for Greece in 2012, the European Commission stated it “welcomes the 
intention of the Greek authorities to introduce over the next two months in the 
Greek legal framework a provision ensuring that priority is granted to debt servicing 
payments.” (European Commission 2012: 6) At other, perhaps more ‘normal’ times, 
debt service prioritization is ensured by the threat of cutting the country off capital 
market access (Eaton 1993: 151-152; Eichengreen 2003: 78-79).
 This illustrates that the assumption that sovereign bond interest rates 
represent the performances and policies of their issuing governments is necessary, 
however risky its foundations. It allows the flow-stock conversion which in turn 
allows the use of sovereign bonds as debt securities. It is only because this asset 
class is issued by a sovereign entity that markets can assume this sovereignty to 
be exercised to guarantee debt repayment, allowing the projection of this payment 
flow as a stock. Yet, this means that the country’s sovereignty is structured by an 
operationalization of the country by creditors. These transpose government policies 
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onto a different level – changing the stakeholder structure, changing the assessment 
criteria, changing the benchmark. They introduce phenomena irreconcilable with 
mere representation. Such phenomena include financial spillovers (Guerreri et al. 
2012: 185), influences of “perceived overall financial risk” (Botta 2013: 423), as well 
as “market sentiment” in interest rate setting (Lo Conte 2009: 344). All of these 
support the hypothesis of a prioritization of the asset function of sovereign bonds – 
creditor interest – over their fiscal function – debtor interest.
 A brief survey of the literature vindicates the hypothesis. Any country can be 
subject to demands backed up or possibly enforced by the ever-present possibility 
of capital flight, i.e., the withdrawal of funds (Eaton 1993: 149; Wolf 2002: 38-52). 
Backed by this pressure, creditors can demand risk premia (Lo Conte 2009: 346). 
Markets can also monitor the debtor country’s policies with regard to the likelihood 
of successful debt servicing (Eaton 1993: 164; Eichengreen 2003: 76). Moreover, 
creditors have opportunities to hedge against risk – in the case of debt repayments, 
futures are particularly relevant (Lo Conte 2009: 347). Outside of Europe, this is 
further reinforced by the denomination of sovereign bonds which, independent 
of the country of issuance, are usually denominated in U.S. dollars – which poses 
additional conversion risks and current account pressures for governments 
servicing their debt, but makes investment and allocation of debt securities easier 
for international portfolios (ibid: 343). In European sovereign bond markets, the 
common denomination of debt securities in Euros has the same effect on Southern 
European countries, as will be discussed below (Lane 2006: 53; Belke 2011: 685; 
Coeuré 2013). At times, as seen above, this is formally reinforced (European 
Commission 2012: 6).
 Thus, the conversion from sovereign bond repayment flows to their projected 
guarantee certainly benefits the creditors (Stiglitz 2010: 35-69). The terms by which a 
sovereign bond is transposed to its asset or stock function are not set by the country 
issuing the bonds. Neither, however, are they arbitrarily set by creditors. They are a 
technicality: a transposition of actual to projected performances, expectations, and 
intertemporal optimization problems (Panizza et al. 2009: 680). Their precise terms 
– and hence their precise effects – must be examined in more detail.
Fundamental and Liquidity-Solvency Conversion
 A closer reading of the flow-stock conversion yields further insights into 
its more hidden, seemingly mundane and technical effects. To uphold the idea of 
a representation of a country’s policies and economic growth by sovereign bond 
interest rates is crucial to the flow-stock conversion, as seen above. More is at stake, 
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however: namely the effect of sovereign debt technicalities on the sovereignty of 
countries issuing sovereign bonds. In the flow-stock conversion discussed above, the 
sovereignty of the debtor country is harnessed as a payment guarantee. Thus, when 
it issues sovereign debt, a country is thus no longer a sovereign country endowed 
with the ability to renege on payments and ultimately to default (independent of 
the consequences of that decision). The priority of the country-market relation 
is reversed: markets have power as creditors, while a sovereign debtor country 
becomes the fundamental of sovereign bonds. I propose to conceptualize this as a 
fundamental, containing both aspects of the flow-stock conversion, as opposed to 
the notion of country fundamentals.
 In the representational perspective, country fundamentals are measurements 
of actual and projected performances of of the economy of the debtor country. 
These economic measurements – mathematical formulae comprised of coefficients 
indicating GDP per capita, current account balance, debt relative to GDP, the 
composition of debt, and future forecasts based on inflation coefficients – indicate 
the fiscal well-being of the debtor country and hence its riskiness as an investment: 
its projected ability to repay debt (Panizza et al. 2009: 685 Fn 50). In the stronger 
sense proposed here, however, fundamentals are more than mathematical formulae. 
Rather, these formulae have effects upon the country: it comes to be operationalized 
by its creditors in order to repay its debts. Thus, the mathematical tools ostensibly 
assessing country fundamentals for interest rate adjustments are in reality effects 
splitting and transposing the country.
 The fundamental restructures its corresponding country to prioritize debt 
servicing. In turn, this imposes restructuring upon the country. Even when no Troika 
is involved as in the Greek or Irish cases,  the fundamental reorganizes the country to 
focus on improving specific economic indicators: its growth vis-à-vis its debt/GDP 
ratio; its socio-economic trajectories such as technological and educational progress 
vis-à-vis inflation. It does so by subjecting the country to benchmarking – in the 
European case, benchmarking against Germany (Holman 2004: 715; Manganelli 
and Wolswijk 2009: 215-216; Pusch 2012: 6). The seemingly arcane technicality of 
how country fundamentals in the classical sense are assessed thus becomes vitally 
important politically since its terms are at once the benchmarking targets imposed 
upon the debtor country through its fundamental.
 What the debtor country can do with the funds derived from the fiscal 
function of debt issuance is thus closely monitored and influenced by its creditors. 
In an orthodox perspective, close monitoring is necessary since elected officials 
tend not to prioritize debt servicing (Eaton 1993: 159-160; Mundell 1996: 115). 
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From a critical perspective, such ‘close monitoring’ is often performed violently, 
either by outright imposition (as seen above for the Greek case), or by the gyrations 
of international capital markets (Strange 1998; LiPuma and Lee 2004). This paper 
takes a middle position: I propose to examine the mechanism behind this using the 
term liquidity-solvency conversion.
 To illustrate this, one must consider the concept of ‘contagion’ on primary 
sovereign bond markets. If the sovereign bond interest rate merely reacted to 
country fundamentals and their sustenance or depletion by more or less rational 
elected officials, as the representational perspective claims, contagion between 
sovereign bonds would be impossible. The fundamentals of one country could not 
have a direct effect on those of another. Even if they are subject to simultaneous 
macroeconomic shocks, the interest rates of the countries’ sovereign bonds would ex 
hypothesi move in the same direction, independently. Only when a financial shock 
occurs in both countries, interest rate co-movement occurs – yet this co-movement 
has no relation to fundamentals (Manganelli and Wolswijk 2009: 193-194; Guerreri 
et al. 2012: 184).
 Such co-movements in the Eurozone are indeed causally related, as capital 
moves from riskier Southern European sovereign bonds to less risky German and 
U.S. bonds (Shambaugh 2012: 216). Prior to 2009, European peripheral current 
account deficits rose continually (Lane 2006: 53). In the crisis, however, the volume 
of cross-country financial account movements into GIPSI countries in particular 
markedly deteriorated, leading to rising interest rates (Nowak 2012: 6). Attributing 
this to individual country fundamentals assessed by market movements is certainly 
possible. In the Greek case, this development is due to a steep decline in the service-
related balance of payments, dropping by 21 per cent from 2007 to 2008 – largely 
a result of the extreme focus of the Greek economy on tourism (Visvizi 2012: 18). 
However, financial account movements were similar for all peripheral European 
countries (Lo Conte 2009: 344; Pusch 2012: 2). This indicates a common origin in 
the ‘market sentiment’ mentioned above.
 Yet, ‘market sentiment’ as an analytical category misses substantial aspects of 
the effects in question since it is an insufficiently precise description of what I propose 
to call liquidity-solvency conversion: a pattern of lending withdrawals forcing 
country fundamentals into specific cross-country benchmarking, resulting in risk 
premia co-movements (Belke 2011: 678). These co-movements were independent 
of the actual macroeconomic differences of European peripheral countries. They 
crossed different types of booms and busts (Ireland’s banking sector, Portugal’s 
public debt, and Cyprus’s financial sector have little in common), different types of 
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distress (Spain’s pre-2008 credit overextension was mainly private, Greece’s mainly 
public), and different sizes of economies (Italy and Greece being on the extreme 
ends of this spectrum). What occurred was a liquidity shortage on sovereign debt 
markets which I maintain was turned into a solvency problem for the countries 
exposed to it as they attempt to roll over debt. An example is the case of Italy in 2011 
(Shambaugh 2012: 169). The Italian government had not been regarded as insolvent 
prior to 2011 (Belke 2011: 685; Bastasin 2012: 288). That summer, however, markets 
inferred a possible insolvency from the refinancing difficulties Greece and Portugal, 
Ireland and Spain were facing, and withdrew their liquidity – thus imposing upon 
Italy the very insolvency they feared to take place (Bastasin 2012: 287).
 I maintain, however, that this liquidity-solvency conversion did not just occur 
in this one case. Its effects are more far-reaching. Through it, markets gain the power 
to restructure debtor countries along the operational lines of their corresponding 
fundamental. This, in turn, means that the precise technical features of each 
respective fundamental have precisely discernible effects upon their corresponding 
countries. Through their fundamental, country governments are operationalized as 
actors whose primary duty is to prevent default, to service debt and to instill market 
confidence that it will continue doing so over the bond’s maturity range. Market 
judgment on anticipated debt servicing constitutes a lending threshold, as markets 
only lend to governments from whom they expect repayment. The means by which 
governments repay old debt, however, stem to substantial extents from market 
lending. Above a certain debt-to-GDP ratio, taxation would not even theoretically 
suffice to repay all sovereign debt. Thus, debt servicing depends substantially on 
the ability of debt roll-over – which is to say that a liquidity withdrawal reduces a 
government’s ability to repay old debt, putting it into arrears which lead to a further 
liquidity withdrawal, and so forth (Shambaugh 2012: 179). Market anticipation of 
debt servicing thus determines the extent to which actual debt servicing can be 
provided.
 It is crucial to examine what this entails for the concept of the fundamental 
– and hence the pressures a country faces when operationalized as such. Based on 
the structural analysis offered above, a fundamental can now be identified as a self-
referential structure which is entirely internal to markets. Lending to countries 
relies on the assessment of a fundamental as sound, i.e., the credibility of a credible 
commitment to uphold fiscal solvency. This, in turn, presupposes debt roll-over 
ability, i.e., market liquidity. A country’s solvency – i.e., its fundamental’s ability 
to maintain fiscal soundness – relies on market liquidity, an exogenous variable 
the country has no control. It relies on financial market conditions: expansion or 
contraction, boom or bust insofar as investment behavior is concerned; contagious 
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dynamics on bond markets. Market actors’ claims to assess country fundamentals 
really mean to say that they assess liquidity conditions: they assess themselves.
 The Eurozone crisis exemplifies this. Here, sovereign bond market liquidity 
is transnationally integrated since currency risk is removed in European Monetary 
Union (EMU) (Schüler 2002; Lo Conte 2009: 347; Manganelli and Wolswijk: 
215-216). This leads to the indiscriminate portfolio movements discussed above 
– ‘market sentiment’ or ‘panic’ (De Grauwe and Ji 2013). For example, in times 
of pre-2008 ‘yield panic’ (Hau and Thum 2009: 716), lending to GIPSI countries 
was considered to be within reasonable risk parameters. After 2009, market distrust 
radiated outward from Greece to other GIPSI countries and beyond, without much 
consideration of the specifics of the country in question.
 By contrast, the solvency of a government remains its national fiscal 
responsibility (Lane 2012: 49-50; cf. Holman 2004: 728). As explained above, this 
has its origin not in national sovereignty per se, but rather in the technical feature 
of sovereign bond issuance discussed above as flow-stock conversion: the country’s 
sovereignty is harnessed as a repayment guarantee. Market imposition of the 
fundamental therefore makes the country responsible not only for debt servicing, 
but also for restructuring its economy to sustain good fundamentals. In addition, 
as seen in this section, a global liquidity crunch brings a country’s debt roll-over 
capabilities under distress, threatening the most important aspect of fundamentals 
(the debt-to-GDP ratio) by removing the funds necessary to service debts and 
by shrinking GDP. By virtue of the liquidity-solvency conversion, this is then 
interpreted by markets as a sign of domestic and fiscal distress (Strange 1998; Wolf 
2002: 38-52; Schiaffino 2013: 457-462).
Intra-Market Hedges and Extra-Market Hedges
 Yet more escalations are contained in the ripple effects of seemingly 
minuscule and benign sovereign debt technicalities. A third layer of conversions 
is added to the country-fundamental transposition at this point. Reinforcing the 
flow-stock conversion and its concomitant liquidity-solvency conversion, this 
third layer determines the exact extent of pressures to which a country is subject 
when it becomes a fundamental – and the concomitant pressures upon financial 
actors lending to the debtor country. The Eurozone crisis is illustrative here: often 
described as a sovereign bond crisis, it is really an interbank market crisis imposed 
upon countries via the liquidity-solvency conversion which also – an aspect often 
neglected in the critical literature – cyclically exacerbates the banking crisis.
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 The description of the Eurozone crisis begins on bank portfolios. European 
banks hold sovereign bonds as tier 1 capital. Of their total assets in 2009Q4, 16 
per cent were government debt securities (Lucarelli 2011: 208). This results in the 
vulnerabilities discussed above: if European governments are unable (or unwilling) 
to repay their debts, these assets are terminated, and the European banking system 
is unable to continue lending – in the worst scenario, banks may not even continue 
to exist (Shambaugh 2012: 159). By no means was that a remote possibility: at 
the height of the Greek phase of the crisis, in June 2010, European banks were 
exposed to more than 200 billion Euros in Greek debt securities (Lucarelli 2011: 
208). Certainly, in a conventional perspective, this makes governmental behavior 
a source of danger for bank portfolios: the country’s extra-market sovereignty 
(ability to renege on payments) continues to haunt the fundamental’s intra-market 
sovereignty (guarantee of debt repayment).
 For legal reasons, this came to be particularly relevant in the Eurozone crisis. 
As stated above, the European Capital Requirements Directive in effect during the 
Eurozone crisis (CRD III) designates sovereign bonds eligible to be tier 1 capital 
assets without restrictions (EU Regulation 575/2013, Art. 214, Sect. 2[a]). Thus, 
when the European public – and its global counterparts – demanded large banking 
institutions to deleverage after the 2007/2008 crisis, European banks ironically 
came to be exposed to sovereign risk (Barroso and Van Rompuy 2011; EBA 2011). 
The extent of this deleveraging process was significant. Throughout Europe, the 
ratio of bank loans to bank deposits went down significantly, from 138 per cent 
to 126 per cent according to ECB figures – a “steady decline” which “points to a 
corresponding substantial reduction in the banking sector leverage.” (ECB 2013) 
Across the European banking system as a whole, tier 1 capital ratios have increased 
from 8 per cent in 2008 to 12 per cent in 2012 (Lawton 2013).
 This also increased the vulnerability of European banks to the sovereign assets 
they held (Isidore 2012). By the same token, countries came to be embedded into the 
dynamics of a European banking crisis through their fundamental – the demands 
of the flow-stock conversion given force by the liquidity-solvency conversion (Blyth 
2015: 73). To explain the extent of this, a second function of countries with regard 
to their sovereign debt must be explored.
 Countries are fundamentals, thus serving their function to stabilize banks’ 
portfolios as tier 1 capital assets. Sovereign bonds are not the only means to stabilize 
banks’ portfolios, however; the same stabilizing function can be performed by the 
credible commitment of sovereigns to bailouts: recapitalizations and asset relief. In 
both ways, the fundamental performs a hedging function for its banking system. 
Moreover, it is made to remain under market supervision while fulfilling its duty 
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to recapitalize or bail out banks by the liquidity-solvency conversion. Thus, in the 
post-2008 bailouts of European banks, governments issued debt securities to raise 
money for bailing out their banks. This was subsequently operationalized by these 
very banks as an increase in sovereign debt loads, leading to lending withdrawals, 
and so forth (Lucarelli 2011: 209). Once again, however, wholesale critiques of these 
practices (particularly those critiques invoking ‘greed’) neglect crucial details whose 
analysis uncovers the precise way in which these effect come to play out.
 Countries serve as fundamentals in two ways – portfolio stabilization 
through debt security issuance, as well as bailouts: recapitalization and asset relief. 
The fundamental thus reconstitutes the country as a double market entity: as an 
intra-market hedge in the former sense (stabilizing portfolios by issuing tier 1 
capital); as an extra-market hedge in the latter sense (bailing out banks). To serve 
as intra-market hedges, as discussed above, countries have to fulfill the economic 
demands of creditors such that the flow-stock conversion can occur. Thus, countries 
have to be ‘fiscally sound’ in order to serve as fundamentals. Yet, what soundness of 
fundamentals denotes is decided by the creditors. Their decisions are enforced by 
the liquidity-solvency conversion, by which European banks (in this case) have the 
power to withdraw liquidity and blame the resulting fiscal shortage on governmental 
insolvency.
 Countries are therefore embedded into market dynamics in a special sense. 
Their double position as market entities (intra-market hedges) and yet as guarantors 
of market structure as a whole (extra-market hedges) is set according to market 
dynamics. Here, the relation between country, fundamental, and sovereign debt is 
subject to the notion of crisis. As extra-market hedges, countries have an obligation 
to bail out banks (Acharya and Steffen 2013). However, the terms of this obligation 
are set by the banking system and are caught up in the self-referential nature of the 
fundamental discussed above, since countries derive the funds to bail out banks 
from market liquidity – i.e., from banks (Botta 2013: 427). Thus, the bailout is 
subject to contradictory conditions set by the financial institutions it rescues.
 First, while straining its finances because it bails out banks, the country must 
also remain fiscally sound because it remains benchmarked by financial institutions 
on the level of the flow-stock conversion. It must maintain “counterinflationary 
credibility.” (Wolf 2002: 44) That is, the country must attempt to issue debt – incurred 
to save banks – at interest rates set by banks. For these to be at low levels, however, 
the country must maintain a low debt-to-GDP ratio (ibid: 43; Botta 2013: 427-428). 
In lieu of suddenly expanding its GDP, the country’s ability to remain ‘sound’ will 
therefore be influenced by the amount of debt it has to service. This leads to a self-
referentiality of bailouts: a direct result of the self-referentiality of the fundamental 
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as a market entity. When it is said that countries bail out banks, this really means that 
countries tap into market funding to disburse it to banks. This is triply convenient 
for creditors. The debt issued by governments serves them as intra-market hedge 
(as tier 1 asset). Secondly, the conditions of issuance (the fundamentals in question 
as well as interest rates) are set by them. Thirdly, the bailout serves as extra-market 
hedge (Acharya and Steffen 2013).
 In the country’s responsibility to fulfill its role as intra- and extra-market 
hedge, the size of its commitments is the independent variable vis-à-vis the country’s 
ability to fulfill its responsibility. The lengths to which this can go can be seen in the 
bank bailouts immediately prior to the Eurozone crisis. Here, this is particularly 
evident, as these bailouts showed a clear size mismatch. European banks’ portfolio 
sizes often exceed the total fiscal capabilities of their corresponding countries. Not 
only was the total asset size of the European banking system three times as large as 
the European real economy in 2007 as well as 2013 (Shambaugh 2012: 162; Lawton 
2013); the largest European banks are also often bigger than the entire GDP of their 
home country – let alone fiscal capability. The Dutch ING group, German Hypo 
Real Estate or Portugal’s Espirito Santo group are examples of this (Hau and Thum 
2008; Goncalves 2014). The Dexia group, for example, whose activities extended far 
beyond Europe, particularly into U.S. subprime markets, had to be recapitalized in 
2008 and 2011 by Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg together, because its 
size exceeded any of the three countries’ capabilities (Guillén 2012: 50; Acharya and 
Steffen 2013).
 This size mismatch allows a conclusion about the nature of the European 
debt crisis. What presents itself as a ‘crisis’ of government solvency is really a crisis of 
liquidity converted into one of solvency. It is neither the result of market irrationality 
nor of governmental overborrowing. Nor was the European crisis caused by investor 
irrationality. Such irrationality presupposes the possibility of rational (or irrational) 
market assessment of preexisting country fundamentals to gauge the rationality or 
irrationality of the investment (Lux 1995). Such preexisting fundamentals, however, 
do not exist, as I have shown earlier. They are in reality a self-referential market 
projection serving as a transmission belt for market demands onto countries. 
Markets may thus well be irrational – but it is not possible to establish when they 
are and which aspects of self-referential liquidity are the result of such irrationality. 
Likewise, the crisis cannot be a question of governmental overborrowing prior to 
2008. This would require that the representational theory holds – that government 
solvency is the independent variable of of country fundamentals and hence 
investments – which I have shown here not to be the case.
 
 Combining these findings finally allows a hypothesis regarding the nature of 
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crisis.’ If, as shown here, market investments are ultimately self-referential, neither 
the pre-2008 expansion shock nor the post-2008 contraction shock in the Eurozone 
can be an aberration from normal mechanisms since these are much contained 
in the overall self-referentiality of the market structure at hand. This is to say that 
neither of them can be ‘crisis’ conditions. They cannot be a result of state moral 
hazard because fundamentals preceding market conditions do not exist. By the same 
token, they cannot be a result of market moral hazard since the object of market 
investment are not a country’s fundamentals – but the country operationalized as a 
fundamental, i.e., as caught up in market self-referentiality. That the country is thus 
structured by the fundamental means that the country cannot be the measuring 
rod of the fundamental’s oscillations – and hence that sovereign bond interest rates 
cannot be measured against anything given. There is no standard, hence there is no 
aberration; there is thus no normality and hence no crisis.
Conclusion
 I have argued here that the origin of the Eurozone crisis lies neither in 
unsustainable public and private borrowing of European peripheral countries prior 
to 2009, as some argue, nor in the unreasonable and/or arbitrary demands of their 
creditor, as others have maintained. Rather, its origin can be found in the effects of 
minuscule and seemingly arcane technicalities to which sovereign debt issuance is 
subject. To show this, I have proposed a set of terms which, I maintain, are better 
equipped to analyze the effects of these minuscule technicalities as other, more 
common terms are. I have proposed to replace the notion of country fundamentals 
(plural) with that of a fundamental (singular) to show that a country is not subject 
to market assessment of its independent policies when it is being lent to, but rather 
subject to market lending pressures forcing it to adopt certain policies even in the 
absence of outright imposition. To better describe the precise nature of market 
pressures in this case, I have proposed the notions of flow-stock conversion and 
liquidity-solvency conversion. The former allows the conversion of sovereign debt 
as a fiscal instrument to sovereign debt as an asset, thus embedding it (and its 
corresponding country) into sovereign debt market dynamics. These, in turn, play 
out as pressure upon the country through the liquidity-solvency conversion turning 
portfolio restructurings into fiscal solvency shortages. Finally, I have proposed the 
notion of countries as intra-market hedges and extra-market hedges to illustrate the 
precise extent of market pressures upon countries: to recapitalize banks, countries 
need to issue more debt at market interest rates, doubling down on the pressure 
from the liquidity-solvency conversion.
 The conclusion of this paper is that countries come to be inscribed into 
market dynamics over which they have no control – and moreover, that these market 
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dynamics are wholly self-referential. How generalizable beyond the Eurozone crisis 
is this finding? At minimum, it seems that the concepts propose here allow a more 
precise account of ‘crises’ outside of the Eurozone if similar regulatory conditions 
obtain. In particular, it appears that the twofold function of sovereign bonds as fiscal 
and portfolio instruments is universal, and that international financial actors often 
use sovereign bonds as tier 1 capital (Guerreri et al. 2012: 182). An example for a 
more general use of the concepts proposed here could be a more dynamic notion 
of counterinflationary credibility. As the fundamental oscillates, and with it the 
country’s fiscal capacities, the incentive structure of political actors oscillates as well. 
In times of liquidity boom, a far broader amount and range of expenses are within 
what is credible as commitments to low inflation. Without the crisis hypothesis, 
it is not irrational, nor morally hazardous, to use this fiscal space. Conversely, 
neither is the deployment of fiscal restrictions by markets under conditions of 
liquidity shortage. At a minimum, a dynamic view thus entails the abandonment of 
the notion of ‘crises’ of sovereign debt, and possibly of financial ‘crisis conditions’ 
in general – insofar as what has been shown here is likely to apply for other real 
economic fundamentals of other classes of assets as well.
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